An Act for Committee Codification

Wonderess

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TNP Constitution:
Article 2. The Regional Assembly

1. Resident means any person with a nation in the region of The North Pacific.
2. The Regional Assembly will consist of all citizens.
3. Requirements for citizenship will be determined by law.
4. The Regional Assembly may enact, amend or repeal laws by a majority vote.
5. The Regional Assembly may remove a government official from office by a two-thirds majority vote.
6. The number of votes required to achieve quorum for any vote of the Regional Assembly except elections will be determined by law.
7. The Regional Assembly will elect a Speaker every four months by a majority vote.
8. The Speaker will administer the rules of the Regional Assembly. Where no rules exist, the Speaker may use their discretion.
9. Abstentions cast in the Regional Assembly will not be used to determine the result of any vote, but may be used for quorum and all other purposes.
10. The Speaker may appoint deputies to assist them in the execution of any of their powers and duties. Appointment of deputies may be regulated by law and the rules of the Regional Assembly.
11. The Speaker shall have the power to create committees made up of citizens to serve the purposes of the Regional Assembly. The structure and scope of committees is to be determined by law.

Article 2. The Regional Assembly

1. Resident means any person with a nation in the region of The North Pacific.
2. The Regional Assembly will consist of all citizens.
3. Requirements for citizenship will be determined by law.
4. The Regional Assembly may enact, amend or repeal laws by a majority vote.
5. The Regional Assembly may remove a government official from office by a two-thirds majority vote.
6. The number of votes required to achieve quorum for any vote of the Regional Assembly except elections will be determined by law.
7. The Regional Assembly will elect a Speaker every four months by a majority vote.
8. The Speaker will administer the rules of the Regional Assembly. Where no rules exist, the Speaker may use their discretion.
9. Abstentions cast in the Regional Assembly will not be used to determine the result of any vote, but may be used for quorum and all other purposes.
10. The Speaker may appoint deputies to assist them in the execution of any of their powers and duties. Appointment of deputies may be regulated by law and the rules of the Regional Assembly.
11. The Speaker shall have the power to create committees made up of citizens to serve the purposes of the Regional Assembly. The structure and scope of committees is to be determined by law.

I very much support the current initiative that establishes committees to help improve dialogue between the executive and the legislative. That being said, the committees are currently enforced by a Delegate Directive. It is my hope that we can codify the committees in law so that their functions are protected by actual law. I believe that we can entrust their existence to the office of Speaker. Once there is a capacity to codify committee structure and proceedings, then I intend to use the delegate directive as a means to amend the Rules of the Regional Assembly so that those statutes come under force of RA approved law.
 
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I am of the opinion that if we are to codify this, it should be similar to the appointment of THO where it is made by both the Delegate and the Speaker.
 
As to the principle of the matter, I am not sure that I support the proposal. The committee innovation is a new one and I would like to see how it fares before codifying it into law. I appreciate that there is a strangeness in committees to oversee the executive being, strictly, executive organs and it may be that, if the idea functions well enough, it would be good to put it on a statutory footing with some changes to fit more coherently with the separation of powers. However, we don't yet have a sense, or at least I don't have a sense, of how well committees work or how they fit into the broader constitutional landscape of the region. I can see senses in which they may be, particularly for foreign affairs and defence matters, but I do think that there are elements which could be problematic, particularly if they lead to a move to the Assembly delegating its functions to too great an extent.

I also do have some philosophical problem with involving the Speaker in the committee system to too great an extent. I am very attached to the Speaker maintaining impartiality and the appearance of impartiality; further the role of the Speaker is properly as a servant of the Assembly and not a master of it. While it plainly depends on the extent of the committees' scope and powers, it does strike me that there is a risk in the Speaker being seen to be partial in the creation and selection of committees if those committees take on a significant role in the region and in how the Assembly dispatches with its business. It also appears to me, again if committees do become more significant in the role they have to play, that entrusting them to the Speaker does create a risk to the role of the Speaker as a servant of the Assembly. Plainly, I appreciate that the Speaker already enjoys wide discretionary power in managing the business of the Assembly, but there are quite longstanding practices in how the Speaker goes about doing so that, together with the restraint of those in the office, have caused that not to materialise into a substantial problem for the role; however, with the creation of substantial new elements of the Assembly, it does appear to me that there would be a risk for problematic evolution in the role that must be taken into account.

As to the drafting, the two additional sentences seem, to my mind, to operate strangely together. The former empowers the Speaker to create committees unilaterally, the latter effectively requires them to be provided for by law. That is to say, it seems the Speaker can create a committee but in so doing not delimit its structure or scope and it seems that the Assembly can provide for the structure and scope of a committee but not actually create it. I should think the more proper way for this to be dealt with is for the power to create committees to be with the Assembly and then a power to appoint members to be with the Speaker.

As to the proposal for rules, I think it should be noted that there is a distinction between rules and laws, where the Assembly may do something by law, it does not follow that it may do it by rule.

A final point I would ask about is as to why a Constitutional amendment is thought necessary. The Assembly has quite broad legislative powers that are not, or do not appear to be, limited to dealing with matters that are dealt with in the Constitution or, at least, not to matters expressly provided for by the Constitution. The cultural laws seem to stem only from the general legislative power, the Election Commission (new and old) and, historically, the offices of the Attorney General and of the Registrar of Confidential Puppets are or were creations of the Legal Code without express Constitutional provision, and any number of elaborations on the functioning of Constitutionally defined offices seem derive from a general legislative authority rather than an express Constitutional provision authorising those elaborations. So, in essence, my question is as to why the author does not propose simply to proceed directly to creating the desired committees by law.
 
As to the principle of the matter, I am not sure that I support the proposal. The committee innovation is a new one and I would like to see how it fares before codifying it into law. I appreciate that there is a strangeness in committees to oversee the executive being, strictly, executive organs and it may be that, if the idea functions well enough, it would be good to put it on a statutory footing with some changes to fit more coherently with the separation of powers. However, we don't yet have a sense, or at least I don't have a sense, of how well committees work or how they fit into the broader constitutional landscape of the region. I can see senses in which they may be, particularly for foreign affairs and defence matters, but I do think that there are elements which could be problematic, particularly if they lead to a move to the Assembly delegating its functions to too great an extent.

I believe the principle function of the committees are to gather understanding about the functions of the Executive and yes even hold the Executive accountable. The RA has the power to recall if necessary, but this is only able to be exercised if there is an understanding of what the executive is doing. To me regardless of how the committees are designed, this is their function and it is a vital one. Therefore, I understand if there are some unknowns about how the committees function, but I think their presence remains necessary despite what tweaks are made.

I also do have some philosophical problem with involving the Speaker in the committee system to too great an extent. I am very attached to the Speaker maintaining impartiality and the appearance of impartiality; further the role of the Speaker is properly as a servant of the Assembly and not a master of it. While it plainly depends on the extent of the committees' scope and powers, it does strike me that there is a risk in the Speaker being seen to be partial in the creation and selection of committees if those committees take on a significant role in the region and in how the Assembly dispatches with its business. It also appears to me, again if committees do become more significant in the role they have to play, that entrusting them to the Speaker does create a risk to the role of the Speaker as a servant of the Assembly. Plainly, I appreciate that the Speaker already enjoys wide discretionary power in managing the business of the Assembly, but there are quite longstanding practices in how the Speaker goes about doing so that, together with the restraint of those in the office, have caused that not to materialise into a substantial problem for the role; however, with the creation of substantial new elements of the Assembly, it does appear to me that there would be a risk for problematic evolution in the role that must be taken into account.

To me, the Speaker's job is to be in charge of process and organization so that the functions and powers of the RA can be faithfully carried out. The speaker is accountable to the citizenry. I believe giving them the power to create or dissolve committees is fundamental to this responsibility since such a committee may be needed if something comes up all of a sudden and waiting for a vote is not feasible. The Speaker is very much a public figure and so adding or removing a committee is a significant exercise of the office. The citizens would surely hold them accountable so that no rash decision would be made. Dissolving a perfectly good committee is an action worthy of recall in my view, so the Speaker would not be so quick to act without just cause if anything out of fear of this result.


As to the drafting, the two additional sentences seem, to my mind, to operate strangely together. The former empowers the Speaker to create committees unilaterally, the latter effectively requires them to be provided for by law. That is to say, it seems the Speaker can create a committee but in so doing not delimit its structure or scope and it seems that the Assembly can provide for the structure and scope of a committee but not actually create it. I should think the more proper way for this to be dealt with is for the power to create committees to be with the Assembly and then a power to appoint members to be with the Speaker.

I believe that there should be uniformity when it comes to how committees operate and that they should follow set procedures. If a committee would be created there would already be a set standard for it to function by. The Speaker has the power because of the ease of erecting a committee in a crisis if need be which is instantaneous. I honestly believe that the Speaker can be trusted.

As to the proposal for rules, I think it should be noted that there is a distinction between rules and laws, where the Assembly may do something by law, it does not follow that it may do it by rule.

This is an important distinction, and I will have to consider it. I my instead try and codify it in the Legal Code instead so that it has that force behind it rather than the rules as I said. It is a mixture of Delegate and Speaker actions so it would have to be placed in a section where both are privy to the document's statutes.

A final point I would ask about is as to why a Constitutional amendment is thought necessary. The Assembly has quite broad legislative powers that are not, or do not appear to be, limited to dealing with matters that are dealt with in the Constitution or, at least, not to matters expressly provided for by the Constitution. The cultural laws seem to stem only from the general legislative power, the Election Commission (new and old) and, historically, the offices of the Attorney General and of the Registrar of Confidential Puppets are or were creations of the Legal Code without express Constitutional provision, and any number of elaborations on the functioning of Constitutionally defined offices seem derive from a general legislative authority rather than an express Constitutional provision authorising those elaborations. So, in essence, my question is as to why the author does not propose simply to proceed directly to creating the desired committees by law.

I wish to establish the committee device as an innate right and power of the Regional Assembly. The legal code only refers to requirements for entry into the RA as well as some procedural statutes dealing with voting. I find the committee power to be much more fundamental because it is a kind of check on the Executive. The Regional Assembly section of the constitution very much focuses on the powers of the body, and I find it fitting that this power held by its overseer be there as well.
 
The committee idea has only been in use for a very short period of time. I do not think we have a full understand of the effectiveness and viability of the committee process to justify a rush to amend the Constitution to include it as an organ of the government.
 
The committee idea has only been in use for a very short period of time. I do not think we have a full understand of the effectiveness and viability of the committee process to justify a rush to amend the Constitution to include it as an organ of the government.

These are my thoughts.

Also the bill as written would entirely remove it from the purview of the Delegate. I like how at the moment the formation is reliant upon both the Speaker and Delegate being involved.
 
Zyvet raised pretty much all the points I would have. It's too soon to be contemplating this, and even if we did, it would be redundant since the RA can do this without a constitutional amendment.
 
I also do have some philosophical problem with involving the Speaker in the committee system to too great an extent. I am very attached to the Speaker maintaining impartiality and the appearance of impartiality; further the role of the Speaker is properly as a servant of the Assembly and not a master of it. While it plainly depends on the extent of the committees' scope and powers, it does strike me that there is a risk in the Speaker being seen to be partial in the creation and selection of committees if those committees take on a significant role in the region and in how the Assembly dispatches with its business. It also appears to me, again if committees do become more significant in the role they have to play, that entrusting them to the Speaker does create a risk to the role of the Speaker as a servant of the Assembly. Plainly, I appreciate that the Speaker already enjoys wide discretionary power in managing the business of the Assembly, but there are quite longstanding practices in how the Speaker goes about doing so that, together with the restraint of those in the office, have caused that not to materialise into a substantial problem for the role; however, with the creation of substantial new elements of the Assembly, it does appear to me that there would be a risk for problematic evolution in the role that must be taken into account.
To me, the Speaker's job is to be in charge of process and organization so that the functions and powers of the RA can be faithfully carried out. The speaker is accountable to the citizenry. I believe giving them the power to create or dissolve committees is fundamental to this responsibility since such a committee may be needed if something comes up all of a sudden and waiting for a vote is not feasible. The Speaker is very much a public figure and so adding or removing a committee is a significant exercise of the office. The citizens would surely hold them accountable so that no rash decision would be made. Dissolving a perfectly good committee is an action worthy of recall in my view, so the Speaker would not be so quick to act without just cause if anything out of fear of this result
I very much appreciate that the Speaker would be accountable for exercise of this power, but that is, in a certain sense, my concern. It creates a substantial area for the Speaker to act, in choosing what matters do and do not merit committees and in choosing which members staff them. These are matters which are not likely to be without public controversy. It is no difficult task to imagine that there will be matters that members think require a committee where the Speaker does not or that there will be members appointed to a committee that are considered to be inappropriate, as examples. This will be liable to lead to the Speaker becoming involved in controversy to a substantially greater extent than they have so far.

That is not to say the Speaker has always avoided controversy, sometimes they must act in a manner that is liable to provoke controversy, but it does not seem to me to be desirable to create greater scope for such controversy in an office that ought, to my mind, be regarded as being impartial.

Further, I do not see that there is likely to be an urgent need for committees. It may be that I am wrong on that point, but certainly it does not appear to have arisen yet. In any event, I do not think that such a requirement for urgency on occasion can be justification for a general power for all occasions.

As to the drafting, the two additional sentences seem, to my mind, to operate strangely together. The former empowers the Speaker to create committees unilaterally, the latter effectively requires them to be provided for by law. That is to say, it seems the Speaker can create a committee but in so doing not delimit its structure or scope and it seems that the Assembly can provide for the structure and scope of a committee but not actually create it. I should think the more proper way for this to be dealt with is for the power to create committees to be with the Assembly and then a power to appoint members to be with the Speaker.
I believe that there should be uniformity when it comes to how committees operate and that they should follow set procedures. If a committee would be created there would already be a set standard for it to function by. The Speaker has the power because of the ease of erecting a committee in a crisis if need be which is instantaneous. I honestly believe that the Speaker can be trusted
I think I may be misunderstanding on this point, but I do not think it is right to say that simply because the Assembly may make provision for committees by law that they must make uniform provision. Indeed, the power to delimit scope suggests that the Assembly could make different provisions as to the scope of different committees.

Further, I think there is a difficulty in the view of the Speaker's power to create a committee when the power to set structures and scope lies with the Assembly and where that power has not been exercised. How could the Speaker create a committee to deal with a matter if they cannot determine the scope of what the committee can deal with? How can they make appointments to it if they cannot determine the roles of those they are appointing or even how many to appoint? The assignment of the power to set structure and scope to the Assembly is suggestive of it not being contained in the general power to "create" that is given to the Speaker, so there become substantial difficulties, as far as I can see, in exercising the creation power without the Assembly having already exercised its power.

A final point I would ask about is as to why a Constitutional amendment is thought necessary. The Assembly has quite broad legislative powers that are not, or do not appear to be, limited to dealing with matters that are dealt with in the Constitution or, at least, not to matters expressly provided for by the Constitution. The cultural laws seem to stem only from the general legislative power, the Election Commission (new and old) and, historically, the offices of the Attorney General and of the Registrar of Confidential Puppets are or were creations of the Legal Code without express Constitutional provision, and any number of elaborations on the functioning of Constitutionally defined offices seem derive from a general legislative authority rather than an express Constitutional provision authorising those elaborations. So, in essence, my question is as to why the author does not propose simply to proceed directly to creating the desired committees by law.
I wish to establish the committee device as an innate right and power of the Regional Assembly. The legal code only refers to requirements for entry into the RA as well as some procedural statutes dealing with voting. I find the committee power to be much more fundamental because it is a kind of check on the Executive. The Regional Assembly section of the constitution very much focuses on the powers of the body, and I find it fitting that this power held by its overseer be there as well.
Again, I do not see that it is not already innate in the power of the Assembly, the Constitution provides that the Assembly may make laws and imposes no apparent limitation on that general power (except that such laws must not be contrary to the Constitution or the Bill of Rights). That the Assembly has, thusfar, not made certain provisions by law, such as establishing committees, does not mean that it cannot do so. It may be that I am wrong on this, but it seems to me that the Assembly could establish a committee by law, if it wished (indeed, I think it arguable that some committees could be established by rule).

That being so, why is a specific power needed and does it not play into a different understanding of the law making power, that the Assembly does not have a general competence?
 
Seeing that the Executive will not be continuing their side of the committee system, I would like to bring this discussion back to the forefront, even if the bill in its current form is not adopted.
 
May I ask why?
You want me to repeat the argument I posted before? This does not require a constitutional amendment. If you want to react to McM's decision, the best course is to start legislation establishing committees legislatively. We can already do that, we do not need to amend the constitution.
 
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lol I thought about posting something in #citizens-chat about how long until Wondo revived this debate but I didn't want to encourage him. :P

Opposed. We've seen the inability of committees to contribute to the region.
 
The current committees are an experiment to test if the idea is viable, with the option to take further actions, including legislation, if it's successful. As of now, it has not been successful, and thus there is no reason to legislate it.
 
I am opposed. Both to this proposal for a constitutional amendment and for the legislation of committees in the first place.
 
Opposed, I have not see any benifit from the Committees' existence and I am unwilling to add bureaucracy to the region.
 
How quickly we give up, dear fellow citizens. A committee requires the right people on it to do the job. If you fill it with inactive people who don't do the job then of course it will "fail". I think we are too quick to pin it on the system rather than the people in it.
 
It is our job to keep the Executive accountable, so of course it will be through legislation in the RA that the Regional Assembly does its job. Oversight is a good thing, and just because it requires legal action does not automatically mean that it isn't worth pursuing.
 
You are proposing a constitutional amendment to codify a new bureaucratic body that has not been proven to work and shows no overt or demonstrative benefit to the region. I am all for accountability of the executive, especially one as overreaching, broad, and powerful as ours. These committees have not shown they can achieve that goal, in their current form or as you have proposed.

Demonstrate a working idea and I will reconsider my position.
 
I think that there remains sufficient merit in the concept of committees to assist in oversight and policy formation for the experiment to continue. I am of the view that it is in the realm of defence and foreign affairs (and, to a lesser extent, World Assembly affairs) where they would be of the most benefit, as they can serve as an intermediate step where disclosure of information to the Assembly at large would be inappropriate.

I think it seems clear that the committees as created did not meet their goals and I would appreciate the insight of their (former) members and that of the Delegate as to why that is. It does seem to me that part of it is simply a question of activity, another, to my mind, is that for many things there is no real need for an intermediary between citizens and the executive.

I remain of the view that constitutional amendment is unnecessary and undesirable, particularly to pursue an experiment, but I don't think there is an issue, presuming my other concerns are addressed, with a legal amendment to enable experimentation with the concept. If they prove to be failures in a new incarnation, then I do not think there is likely to be much problem disestablishing them.
 
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